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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the operation of the convention of political neutrality in 
the New Zealand Public Service. Political neutrality encourages effective 
government by ensuring that the public service is responsive to its political masters, 
and by facilitating public and government confidence in the public service. 
The past two decades have seen some significant changes in the role and 
management of the public service, particularly in relation to chief executives. These 
changes have increased the contact that public servants are likely to have with non-
government politicians in the conduct of their official duties. These changes have 
also increased public awareness of, and interest in, the operation of the public 
service. The increased attention to individual public servants generated by these 
changes means that behaviour by public servants is more likely to be identified by 
politicians and the public as evidence of political partiality than traditionally. The 
impact of these changes on political neutrality has been further accentuated by the 
overall reduced ability of the public service to protect the convention. 
This paper considers the impact of these developments on the operation of 
the convention, and sets out ways in which this impact can be minimised. The public 
service culture can, and must, be revived to provide effective protection for this 
convention. More strict statutory provisions are necessary for public servants 
wishing to stand for Parliament. Finally, limited categorisation is required within the 
public service to provide clearer guidance for all public servants. If these steps are 
not taken, this paper asserts that the convention of political neutrality in the public 
service will be eroded, to the detriment of the efficacy and legitimacy of the New 
Zealand system of government. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 12, 920 words. 
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THE POLITICAL NEUTRALITY OF THE NEW ZEALAND PUBLIC SERVICE 
I INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional convention of the political neutrality of the public service 
plays a significant role in the continued efficacy and accountability of the New 
Zealand Public Service. As such, it has been a central feature of the public service 
since major reforms in 1912. 1 The convention of political neutrality encourages 
effective government in two ways. 
Political neutrality provides a mechanism to ensure that the public service is 
responsive to its political masters, and does not develop an independent political 
agenda. This is vital for individual ministerial responsibility to effectively control 
the public power exercised by the public service. This mechanism for accountability 
to Parliament, and through Parliament to the public, prevents this powerful limb of 
government from becoming divorced from the needs of the public. 
Political neutrality further promotes effective government by ensuring that 
the public service is able to adequately meet the needs of current and future 
governments. Political neutrality protects the relationship between current Ministers 
and the public service in a way that does not threaten future relationships if the 
government changes hands. This prevents the re-shuffling of the public service with 
every change of government. 2 
The perception of political neutrality is as important for these purposes as the 
actual neutral implementation of policy by the public service. This public perception 
1 The Public Service Commission (the predecessor of the current State Services Commission) was 
established in 1912 to employ all public servants , thus protecting the public service from political 
interference and enabling political neutrality. See: State Services Commission Briefing for the 
Minister of State Services (Wellington, 2002 .) 30 . 
2 This re-shuffling is necessary in politicised bureaucracies such as in the United States: Matthew 
Palmer "Towards an Economics of Comparative Political Organization : Examining Ministerial 
Responsibility" [1995] Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 164, 181 . 
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is necessary to maintain public confidence in the public service. Without this 
confidence, the democratic legitimacy of the New Zealand system of government 
may be compromised. 
In this paper I explore the operation of the convention of political neutrality 
in the New Zealand Public Service. Initially I will describe the constitutional 
justifications for the convention, and the relationship between this convention and 
other conventions governing the public service. I will then briefly outline the limited 
ways in which the convention has been codified in statute and constitutional 
documents. In the central part of this paper I will describe some of the significant 
developments of the past two decades, and the impact that these have had on the 
public service. I finally evaluate the effect of these developments, and set out some 
recommendations for the effective protection of political neutrality in New Zealand. 
For the purposes of this paper, I will use the definition of 'public service ' set 
out in the State Sector Act 1988.3 'Public servant' will be used to denote all public 
service employees, including chief executives.4 Although some of this discussion 
touches upon the behaviour expected of other government employees, such as crown 
entity employees, this paper will not specifically consider the application of political 
neutrality to these employees. 
II CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
A Public Power Exercised by the Public Service and the Need for Control 
The New Zealand Public Service consists of 36 government departments, 
who employ a total of 30,000 employees.5 The public service supports Ministers in 
3 The State Services Act 1988, s 27 defines ' public service ' as all government departments listed in 
the First Schedule of that Act. 1 have chosen this definition as the Public Service Code of Conduct 
only applies to these public servants. 
4 The term ' official' will also be used to identify higher-level public servants . 
5 State Services Commission Briefing f or the Minister of State Services (Wellington, 2002) 33. 
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carrying out their ministerial responsibilities.6 This role effectively means that the 
public service carries out the administration of the country, earning the public 
service the description: "the fourth branch of government".7 The public service is the 
chief source of information and advice for the government when developing policy. 
The public service then implements the government policies that result. This role 
encourages political stability, by providing continuity in the provision of public 
services: 8 
The public service is the machinery of government. If Cabinet and individual 
ministers direct something to be done, or the law so requires, it is usually the public 
service that does it. The public service also advises Cabinet ministers as to what 
they should want done. Because of this, and because they generally have more 
information, expertise and time to think than ministers, public servants have power. 
Much of the power exercised by the public service comes from the discretion 
apparent in the policy advice role of senior officials. In their capacity as policy 
advisors these public servants identify material issues and facts for consideration by 
their Minister. This control over the flow of information to Ministers can give the 
public service a significant ability to shape the direction that policy will take: 9 
Quite simply, decisions are made on the basis of the information available, and this 
means that the content of decisions is invariably structured by the advice offered. 
Moreover, as the principal source of the advice available to politicians, bureaucrats 
effectively control the flow of information: politicians know what civil servants tell 
them. Information can thus be concealed or 'shaped' to reflect the preferences of the 
civil service. 
6 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 200 I), para 2.143. 
7 Andrew Heywood Politics (Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1997) 350. 
8 Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP 
(3ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 78. 
9 Heywood, above, 346. 
The public service is also potentially powerful in its policy implementation 
role. Politicians can seek alternative sources of policy advice, yet they are compelled 
to leave policy implementation in the hands of the public service. This is a 
significant source of power: 10 
Control of implementation gives civil servants the opportunity to reinterpret the 
content of policy, as well as to delay or even thwart its introduction. 
Although Ministers provide departments with policy direction, their lack of 
time, information and experience often limit the extent to which Ministers can 
provide detailed instructions to their department. 11 Departments regularly exercise 
discretion when implementing policy, as Ministers delegate decision-making about 
administrative details to their department. Responsiveness to the government of the 
day is therefore essential for the constitutional legitimacy of the public service. 
Without this, non-elected officials would impose an interpretative force upon 
government policy that is not consistent with democratic control. 
B Relationship between Political Neutrality and Other Conventions 
Governing the Public Service 
I What are constitutional conventions? 
Constitutional conventions are accepted norms of political behaviour that are 
generally acknowledged to have attained a significance and status worthy of general 
acknowledgement. 12 They constantly evolve to reflect changing political practice 
and political science. 13 Conventions "co-ordinate the practices of government and 
provide means for co-operation between the organs" .14 In this way, conventions 
IO Heywood, above, 351. 
I I Heywood, above, 352. 
12 Phillip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed , Brookers Ltd , 
Wellington, 2001) 273. 
13 Joseph , above,271 . 
14 Joseph, above, 271 . 
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provide some control over the exercise of legal power, and promote responsible 
government in accordance with democratic will. 15 Although conventions are very 
influential, they are not laws and for this reason they cannot be enforced in the 
courts. The convention of political neutrality can only be enforced in court to the 
extent that it has been reiterated in statute. It can also only be used to base 
disciplinary action to the extent that political neutrality forms part of the conditions 
of a public servant's employment contract. 
2 The convention of political neutrality of the public service 
The constitutional convention of political neutrality requires all members of 
the public service to act neutrally towards political parties in the exercise of their 
functions. Political neutrality enables the public service to maintain a positive 
working relationship with the current government, while retaining the ability to 
foster the same relationship with an incoming government, thus maintaining public 
confidence. 
A relationship of trust and confidence between department and Minister is 
particularly important when Ministers have multiple portfolios. Ministers are very 
reliant on their departments to inform and advise correctly and comprehensively, to 
undertake the day-to-day activities of the department, and to implement government 
policy. 16 If the Minister has any concern that this reliance is misplaced, the Minister 
will be unlikely to trust the department with important matters: 17 
(J]f the relationship between [Ministers and the public service] breaks down then the 
democratically-elected component of government loses its ability to govern, and the 
15 Joseph, abov~271. 
16 Juliet Philpott Public Servants and Public Accountability: the Convention of Anonymity (LLB 
(Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2001) 6. 
17 Matthew Palmer The Relationship between Ministers and Public Servants: Forum Session I: 
Constitutional Overview (Paper presented to the New Zealand Centre for Public Law and the Institute 
of Policy Studies forum "The Relationship between Ministers and Public Servants", Wellington, 25 
October 200 I) I . 
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component of government chosen for its competence in advising on and 
implementing decisions loses its legitimacy. 
This is likely to occur if Ministers feel that the public service is following an internal 
political agenda, hence the importance of political neutrality. 
When the government changes, an incoming government must also feel 
confident that the public service will act loyally , and conduct their duties in a 
politically neutral manner for the next term of government. This is the ' litmus test ' 
of a politically neutral public service. 18 
In addition, it is essential that the New Zealand public feel that the public 
service are responsive to their needs, through their elected representatives. By 
fostering neutrality in the provision of advice and the implementation of policy, the 
convention of political neutrality helps to ensure that the public service remains 
responsive to government direction. This helps maintain the democratic legitimacy 
of government. 
In order to meet the needs set out above, public servants must not only act in 
a politically neutral manner, but must also appear to be acting in this way at all 
times. Although the public is unlikely to be able to identify whether public servants 
are in fact acting neutrally, the media provides extensive publicity for any semblance 
of political behaviour. This publicity can have a corresponding impact on public 
confidence in the service. As a result, the perception of neutrality can at times be 
even more important than actual neutral behaviour. 
For higher-level public servants , this can mean that their obligation of 
political neutrality extends beyond their professional work to include behaviour in 
their personal capacity. This is identified in the Public Service Code of Conduct, 
18 Graham Scott Public Management in New Zealand: Lessons and Challenges (Business 
Roundtable, Wellington, 2001) 78 . 
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which emphasises that public servants must not permit their personal activities to 
interfere with, or appear to interfere with, their obligations to government.
19 
3 Political neutrality and individual ministerial responsibility 
Public accountability of the public service is maintained through the political 
doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility. Under this doctrine, Responsible 
Ministers are required to account to Parliament for the conduct of their relevant 
department. When departmental error occurs, the Minister must account for this 
error, even if they were not involved in, or had no knowledge of the circumstances 
leading up to the error. At its most extreme, individual ministerial responsibility can 
lead to the dismissal of the Responsible Minister.20 
The doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility is predicated upon the 
assumption that government departments are in fact controlled by, and are 
responsive to the government of the day through the Responsible Minister. The 
convention of political neutrality helps to ensure this responsiveness by reducing the 
potential for political interference in the operation of the public service. In this way 
the risk of the public service being used as a powerful political machine is reduced.
21 
Individual ministerial responsibility only provides effective control if 
electoral competition is capable of having a real impact upon the operation and 
direction of the public service.22 If the public service were no longer responsive to 
their political masters, Ministers would be reluctant to take political responsibility 
for departmental error. 
19 Consider for instance: State Services Commission Public Service Code of Conduct 2001 
(Wellington, 2001) 9. 
20 Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP 
(3ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 72. 
21 Andrew Heywood Politics (Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1997) 351. 
22 Matthew Palmer "Towards an Economics of Comparative Political Organization: Examining 
Ministerial Responsibility" [1995) Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 164, 181. 
11 
Concern that the New Zealand public service will develop an internal 
political agenda is not entirely unfounded. At certain stages of New Zealand's 
history the public service has been accused of this, due to its lack of responsiveness 
to government. In the 1970s and 1980s, some critics identified the long-term and 
broad orientation of the public service as meaning that the public sector balance had 
shifted too far from political control: 23 
It was argued by critics of the third Labour government (1972-5) that the 
combination of an entrenched conservative public service culture and the policy 
inclinations of senior officials had frustrated and even subverted their policy 
objectives. 
This risk has been reduced by the shorter appointment periods for chief 
executives under the State Sector Act 1988.24 There is always a risk, however, that a 
department will develop an internal culture that is not consistent with the 
government's objectives. This is a particular risk when an incoming government 
wishes to take a very different policy approach from previous governments.25 As a 
current Minister noted:26 
When you are a Minister of an area that you know very little about, your department 
tends to continue in the same direction that they had been going under the previous 
government. In this situation, they lead the Minister, not the Minister leading them. 
This is when you become wary of public servants following an internal culture. 
A department culture can become so embedded that a public servant is 
unaware that they are following it. This can then generate a lack of responsiveness 
23 Jonathan Boston, John Martin, June Pallot and Pat Walsh Public Management: the New Zealand 
Model (Oxford University Press, 1996, Auckland) 56. 
24 Chief executives are now appointed for renewable periods of up to five years: State Sector Act 
1988, s 38(1). 
25 This was the case for the Labour-Alliance Government (1999-2002), coming into power with very 
different policies from those that had been followed by the public service under the previous 
(predominantly National-led) governments in the 15 years prior. (Interview with A, anonymous 
current Minister (the author, Wellington, 10 September 2002).) 
26 Interview with A, anonymous current Minister (the author, Wellington, 10 September 2002). 
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within the department that has the effect of compromising ministerial responsibility 
as effectively as if this were deliberate. 
This risk is been highlighted by the Mixed Member Proportional electoral 
system (MMP). MMP increases the likelihood that a department will have to deal 
with a Minister who is inexperienced not only in executive management but also in 
government, and even Parliament. Margaret Wilson's appointment as a Minister in 
1999 shows that a party can bring a non-MP on to its list and straight into Cabinet. 
In addition, a small party may reach the 5% threshold for seats in Parliament, and 
gain a pivotal position ( even membership of a governing coalition) all m one 
election. 27 
4 Political neutrality and public service loyalty 
In addition to the conventions of political neutrality and individual 
ministerial responsibility, the New Zealand public service is governed by the 
convention of loyalty to the government of the day. This convention demands that 
public servants comply with the requests of their Responsible Minister, while 
simultaneously meeting the needs of the government of the day. 28 
The convention of political neutrality limits this loyalty. It requires that 
public servants be loyal to the government of the day, without displaying partiality 
to the political parties that make up government: 29 
Public servants serve the Government in the formulation and implementation of its 
policies, but they do not serve the interests of the political parties that comprise the 
Government. 
27 Consider Labour's adoption of the Progressive Coalition party as coalition partner following the 
2002 elections. This party remarkably did not even break the 5% threshold for party seats, relying 
solely on its two electorate seats. 
28 State Services Commission Public Service Code of Conduct 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 10. 
29 State Services Commission Responsibility and Accountability: Standards Expected of Public 
Service Chief Executives - Key Documents (Wellington, June 1997). 
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At times this distinction may be difficult for public servants to draw. When a 
public servant is faced with a Minister's request, political neutrality demands that 
that public servant ensure that this request is on behalf of the government, rather 
than the Minister's political party. This distinction may even be impossible to make, 
as the two will sometimes comfortably overlap. During an election period, however, 
political tension runs high, and public servants must ensure that their conduct cannot 
be said to be politically partial.3° 
One way in which a balance between political neutrality and loyalty to the 
government is maintained relates specifically to officials who provide policy advice 
to the Minister. The Cabinet Manual states: 31 
Although regard must be had to the policies and priorities of the government of the 
day, the advice given by officials must be 'free and frank', so that Ministers can 
take decisions based on all the facts and an appreciation of all the options. 
The Public Service Code of Conduct reinforces this. It imposes a duty on officials to 
alert Ministers to all possible consequences of following particular policies, 
"whether or not such advice accords with Ministers' views."32 
It is vital that the public service manages this balance between loyalty and 
political neutrality effectively. If the public service appears to be too responsive to 
the government of the day, this can lead to suspicion by an incoming government 
that the public service is not politically neutral. 
30 The State Services Commissioner has sought to make this distinction easier for public servants by 
publishing Guidance for Public Servants During Election Year (Wellington, 2002). 
31 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001), para 2.147. 
32 State Services Commission Public Service Code a/Conduct 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 10. 
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5 Political neutrality and public service anonymity 
The constitutional convention of the anonymity of the public service is based 
on the principle that, in law, public servants are purely an extension of the 
Minister:33 
The employees of the department are the minister's agents ; everything they do, they 
do in his or her name. In the eyes of the law, the permanent official is an anonymous 
instrument of the minister. 
The conventions of political neutrality and anonymity complement each 
other. Anonymity demands that public servants remain faceless , fostering the 
illusion that executive government consists of no more than its democratic element, 
the Minister. If public servants develop a public presence through activities such as 
criticising the government, or responding to criticism by a Minister, they undermine 
the fiction of seamless government.34 This complements political neutrality, which 
requires public servants to be entirely responsive to government, with no political 
persona or priorities of their own. 
The past decade has shown a significant reduction in public service 
anonymity. No longer the anonymous instrument, the public has witnessed a chief 
executive challenging the State Services Commissioner in the Employment Court, 
alleging political interference in her non-reappointment.35 Recent history has also 
shown a chief executive resigning from his position following the Cave Creek 
disaster, taking public responsibility for departmental error. 36 The Official 
33 Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP 
(3ed , Oxford University Press , Auckland, 1997) 71. (Referring to the Report of the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry on the State Services in New Zealand, Wellington, 1962, 31 .) 
34 James , Colin The Tie that Binds: The Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 72. 
35 Christine Kathryn Rankin v A-G in respect of the State Services Commissioner (2 August 200 I , 
Employment Court Wellington, WRC 8/01, Goddard CJ.) 
36 Matthew Palmer "Ministerial Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability: Conflict or 
Complement?" (Paper presented at the Institute for International Research conference on " Analysing 
and Understanding Crucial Developments in Public Law", Wellington, 4 April 2001) 14. 
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Information Act has also reduced the anonymity of public servants, increasing public 
awareness of government decision-making processes and the role of officials in this 
process. 
This loss of anonymity increases the level of media attention on public 
servants. This threatens public perception of political neutrality, by highlighting any 
examples of political behaviour by public servants. 37 This increased media attention 
means that low-level political activity by public servants has a more detrimental 
impact on perceptions of political neutrality than in the past. 
Reduced anonymity also increases the risk that other actors will attempt to 
single out members of the public service for political advantage. The greater the 
public presence of public servants, the greater the risk that they will be targeted by 
political players, or by interest groups attempting to influence policy development or 
implementation. Each of these possibilities threatens the continued political 
neutrality of the public service. 
III POLITICAL NEUTRALITY TODAY: LIMITED CODIFICATION 
The convention of political neutrality has been codified to a certain extent by 
the Electoral Act 1993, the Public Service Code of Conduct 2001 , and the Cabinet 
Manual 2001 . These set out a combination of statutory obligations and behavioural 
guidelines for public servants. 
A Electoral Act 1993 
The Electoral Act 1993 promotes political neutrality by preventing public 
servants from qualifying for candidacy while they are actively employed by the 
37 This can be seen in the media attention that was devoted to the speech by then Governor of the 
Reserve Bank, Don Brash, at a 2001 Catching The Knowledge Wave conference. Although the 
Governor is not a public servant, this incident demonstrated how willing the media is to highlight any 
potentially political behaviour by government employees. 
16 
public service. The Act requires public servants who wish to become a candidate for 
election as a Member of Parliament (MP), to take leave for this purpose.38 
When a public servant is on leave for candidacy purposes, they are not 
permitted to carry out any official duties and are not entitled to receive a salary, 
although they may receive holiday pay.39 If elected, their office as a public servant is 
deemed to have been vacated.40 If they are not elected, they are eligible to return to 
their position as if they had been on leave for any other reason. 41 
B Public Service Code of Conduct 2001 
The Public Service Code of Conduct 2001 (the Code) is issued by the State 
Services Commissioner under the State Sector Act 1988.42 The Code provides 
"minimum standards of integrity and conduct" for the public service.43 The 
obligations owed by public servants to the government and to their Responsible 
Minister are set out in the Code as broad statements of principle. These obligations 
are then implied into the conditions of employment of all public servants.44 
The Code specifically recognises the convention of political neutrality.45 It 
promotes the convention by restricting political activity, and any other activity that 
could compromise the convention:46 
Public servants need to ensure that their participation in political matters does not 
bring them into conflict, or the appearance of conflict, with their duty as public 
servants to act in a politically neutral manner. 
38 Electoral Act 1993, s 52(2). 
39 Electoral Act 1993, s 52(5). 
40 Electoral Act 1993, s 53(2). 
41 Electoral Act 1993, s 53(2). 
42 State Sector Act 1988, s 57 . 
43 State Sector Act 1988, s 57. 
44 Interview with C, anonymous public servant (the author, Wellingtori , 4 September 2002.) 
45 State Services Commission Public Service Code of Conduct 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 9. 
46 State Services Commission Public Service Code a/Conduct 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 13. 
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The Code reinforces the prohibition against public servants standing for 
Parliament unless they have taken leave, and describes activities that could pose a 
threat to political neutrality.47 These activities include public comment on 
Government policy:48 
Public Servants should ensure that their contribution to any public debate or 
discussion on such matters is appropriate to the position that they hold, and is 
compatible with the need to maintain a politically neutral Public Service. 
The Code emphasises that no matter how a public servant feels personally 
about a particular policy, they have an obligation to advise upon and implement this 
in a strictly politically neutral manner: 49 
[P]ublic servants may not withhold relevant information from Ministers, nor seek to 
obstruct or delay a decision, nor attempt to undermine nor improperly influence 
Government policy (for example , by the unauthorised release of official 
information). 
The obligations set out in the Code are reiterated in two further ways. Each 
government department produces a departmental code of conduct, based on the 
Public Service Code of Conduct. Departmental codes are tailored to the 
circumstances of individual departments to provide more specific guidance for 
public servants. 50 The State Services Commission also publishes further guidance 
material for public servants.51 Each of these publications emphasise political 
47 State Services Commission Public Service Code of Conduct 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 14. 
48 State Services Commission Public Service Code of Conduct 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 11. 
49 State Services Commission Public Service Code of Conduct 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 10. 
50 State Services Commission Briefing f or the Minister of State Services (Wellington, 2002.) 
Available on :<htrp: //www . sc.gov1.nz/d isp lay/doc ument. nsp?m1vid= l 15> (last accessed 25 August 
2002). 
51 See for example: State Services Commission Public Servants, Political Parties and Elections 
(Wellington, 2002 .) 
18 
neutrality, although neither departmental codes, nor Commission guidance material, 
form part of a public servant's conditions of employment. 52 
C Cabinet Manual 2001 
The Cabinet Manual sets out the key principles and procedures that a 
government expects to follow while in power. It does not create legal obligations, 
but provides a "sound, transparent and proven basis on which to operate. "53 The 
Cabinet Manual 2001 declares that: 54 
The New Zealand public service is founded on the concept of political neutrality, 
enabling officials to advise Ministers of successive governments as part of the 
continuing process of government. Public servants implement the decisions of the 
government of the day and provide free and frank advice to Ministers. 
The Cabinet Manual notes that when public servants undertake their 
professional duties they must comply with certain constitutional principles and 
values. These include the principles of neutrality , independence and the ' values of a 
career service. ,55 
Political neutrality requires public servants to "ensure that their personal 
interests or activities do not interfere with, or appear to interfere with" their 
obligations to their Minister.56 The Cabinet Manual anticipates that there may be 
situations where the demands of a public servant' s position will prevent them from 
undertaking an activity in their personal capacity. The Cabinet Manual also requires 
that: 57 
52 Interview with C, anonymous public servant (the author, Wellington, 4 September 2002). 
53 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001.) Foreword by Hon. Helen Clark, Prime 
Minister. 
54 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001) para 2.143. 
55 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 5. 
56 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 200 I) para 2.146 . 
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Any contact between public servants and representatives of political parties within 
or outside the government should take place only with prior ministerial approval. 
Such precautions are intended to ensure that a Minister retains their trust in 
their public servants. The Cabinet Manual further imposes an obligation on 
Ministers not to compromise the political neutrality of the public service. Although 
Ministers may require officials to provide factual or statistical material, officials 
"should not be required to offer comment or opinion on clearly political topics, such 
as policies mooted by other parties in Parliament."58 
IV RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CHALLENGING THE CONVENTION 
To say that public servants are technocrats is absolute rubbish. Everything that 
many public servants deal with is political because it is about resource allocation 
and it has values embedded in it. You can't make a tidy distinction between 
management and politics. 59 
A The State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989 
The State Sector Act 1988 (SSA) and the Public Finance Act 1989 (PF A) 
represented a move from 'command and control', towards performance-driven 
management of the public service.60 This move has impacted on the convention of 
political neutrality due to its emphasis on the accountability of chief executives for 
specific outcomes. The SSA has also increased the potential for the politicisation of 
the public service. This is reflected in mechanisms such as Cabinet approval of 
candidates in the chief executives appointment process. Simultaneously, the SSA 
57 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001) para 2.163. 
58 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001) para 2.148. 
59 Comment by participant under the Chatham House Rules at the series of forums on "The 
Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives", organised by the New Zealand Centre for 
Public Law and the Institute of Policy Studies (Wellington, October-November 2001 and April 2002.) 
Comment quoted in: James, Colin The Tie that Binds: The Relationship between Ministers and Chief 
Executives (Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 13. 
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reinforces the convention by introducing transparency into any political input into 
the appointment process, and by removing Minister involvement in personnel 
decisions within the public service. 
1 Increased public accountability of chief executives 
Under the SSA and the PF A, chief executives are allocated responsibility for 
particular outputs and for financial and personnel matters, while Ministers retain 
responsibility for political matters. 61 The SSA delegates to chief executives the 
authority to ensure that their departments deliver the contracted outputs in an 
efficient and effective manner.62 Chief executives are then publicly accountable for 
the exercise of this authority. Chief executives must explain fully and accurately all 
aspects of their own or their department's performance when called upon by the 
State Services Commissioner or their Minister.63 This increases the transparency of 
the chief executive's role: 64 
Because of this, and the greater openness of official information, chief executives 
are more in the public eye than they used to be, relative to their political masters ... 
this has led to an uneasy interface in practice between the political wing of 
government and its administrative element. 
One impact of the SSA has been that increasingly chief executives, rather 
than Ministers, "are held answerable for success or failure of management or 
administration, both in front of parliamentary committees and in the media."65 In 
60 Graham Scott Public Management in New Zealand: lessons and Challenges (Business 
Roundtable, Wellington, 200 I) I 6. 
61 The principal responsibilities of chief executives under the State Sector Act 1988 are set out in 
section 32 of that Act. 
62 State Services Commission "The Public Service and Government" Public Service Principles, 
Convention and Practice - Guidance Material (Wellington, 1995) 4. 
63 State Services Commission Responsibility and Accountability: Standards Expected of Public 
Service Chief Executives - Key Documents (Wellington, 1997.) 
64 Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP 
(3ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 74. 
65 Colin James Under New Sail: MMP and Public Servants (Institute of Policy Studies, VUW, 
Wellington, 1997) 14. 
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addition, "[s]elect committees of parliament examine departmental performance 
routinely with no involvement of Ministers." 66 
To an extent the distinct accountabilities set out by the SSA and the PF A 
1989 make this increased public contact inevitable: 67 
[F]or practical day to day purposes at least, chief executives have a distinct 
accountability that is separate in many respects from those of their ministers. In 
normal circumstances, the public and politicians look to public agencies for that 
accountability, rather than directly to the ministers. 
Although chief executives are accountable for the day-to-day management of the 
department, departments politically remain "extensions of the Minister acting in the 
Minister's name and in accordance with the Minister's wishes and direction".68 
Despite the increased accountability of chief executives, political responsibility 
continues to rest most appropriately with the Minister.69 
There are still significant incentives for chief executives to ensure that 
mistakes do not happen, as they risk severance or non-renewal of their contract on 
performance grounds. 70 In some circumstances, chief executives may decide to 
resign from office even where they are not at fault, due to the events that have taken 
place and the public perception of them. This possibility is identified in the Hunn-
66 Graham Scott Public Management in New Zealand: lessons and Challenges (Business 
Roundtable, Wellington, 2001) 124. The practice of chief executives appearing before select 
committees was instituted by the 1986 revision of Parliament's Standing Orders. This has also meant 
accountability to the public, as select committee hearings are open to the news media: James, Colin 
The Tie that Binds: The Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives (Institute of Policy 
Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 31. 
67 Graham Scott Public Management in New Zealand: lessons and Challenges (Business 
Roundtable, Wellington, 2001) 124. 
68 State Services Commission "The Public Service and Government" Public Service Principles, 
Convention and Practice - Guidance Material (Wellington, I 995) 4. 
69 Matthew Palmer The Relationship between Ministers and Public Servants: Forum Session I: 
Constitutional Overview (Paper presented to the New Zealand Centre for Public Law and the Institute 
of Policy Studies forum "The Relationship between Ministers and Public Servants", Wellington, 25 
October 2001) 3. 
70 Scott, above, 126. 
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Wintringham 'Standards Letter', sent to chief executives by the State Services 
Commissioner.71 This letter states that there may be times "when a chief executive is 
seen as under pressure to resign because of public perception rather than personal 
culpability."72 In these cases it may be difficult for the State Services Commissioner 
to ensure that the political neutrality of the Public Sector is protected. 
The increased public accountability of chief executives following the SSA 
and the PF A does not in its own right threaten the convention of political neutrality. 
The challenge posed by these Acts derives from the increased public presence that 
chief executives have developed as a result, and the risk that the public will perceive 
any conflict between a Minister and chief executive as representing a lack of 
ministerial control over that department. Further, with increased public visibility, the 
importance of public servants (and in particular chief executives) not displaying any 
behaviour that could be perceived as politically partial, intensifies. 
2 Appointment of chief executives 
The SSA transferred responsibility for the appointment of chief executives to 
the State Services Commissioner. The appointment of chief executives through this 
process, although not entirely free from political input, protects neutrality by making 
political input transparent. 73 
The State Services Commissioner initiates the process of appointing a chief 
executive by consulting with an advisory group appointed for this purpose. The 
Commissioner then recommends a candidate to the Executive Council (Cabinet and 
the Governor-General). If the Executive Council accepts the candidate, the 
71 This letter codified the principles of accountability that apply to chief executives following the 
Cave Creek disaster: State Services Commission Responsibility and Accountability: Standards 
Expected of Public Service Chief Executives - Letter lo Chief Executives (Wellington, 1997). 
72 State Services Commission Responsibility and Accountability: Standards Expected of Public 
Service Chief Executives - Letter to Chief Executives (Wellington, 1997) 
73 For instance, under the State Services Act 1988, s 35(2)(b), the State Services Commissioner must 
consider "any matters" the minister considers important when making the appointment: Scott, above, 
16. 
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Commissioner will appoint that candidate as chief executive. If not, the search 
begins anew. In fourteen years, however, only one recommendation has been 
rejected: 74 
In practice, informal discussions before a formal nomination are likely to obviate 
the possibility of a candidate being rejected by the Executive Council. 
The requirement for Cabinet approval meant that some commentators feared 
that candidates would be judged on their political compatibility with the Minister, 
leading to political appointments of chief executives.75 The SSA attempts to 
minimise this risk by ensuring that any direct ministerial intervention is relatively 
transparent, enabling parliamentary scrutiny and criticism. 76 
Section 3 5(11) of the SSA enables Cabinet to make its own appointment to a 
position of chief executive, although this provision has not yet been used. 77 This has 
not prevented opposition politicians from threatening to sack senior civil servants if 
they get elected.78 The SSA confers responsibility for personnel matters within a 
department upon chief executives. 79 This means that a political appointment of a 
chief executive could lead to politicisation within the rest of the public service. 
The review and re-appointment of chief executives is delegated to the 
Commissioner under the SSA.8° Chief executives are appointed for terms of up to 
five years, with possible reappointment: 81 
74 Colin James The Tie that Binds: The Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 6, 19. 
75 Colin James Under New Sail: MMP and Public Servants (Institute of Policy Studies, VUW, 
Wellington, 1997) 19. 
76 Jonathan Boston, John Martin, June Pallot, and Pat Walsh Public Management: the New Zealand 
Model (Oxford University Press, 1996, Auckland) I 00. 
77 Boston, above, I 02. 
78 Graham Scott Public Management in New Zealand: Lessons and Challenges (Business 
Roundtable, Wellington, 2001) 78, referring to comments made by Hon Michael Cullen in 1999, and 
National Party leaders before the 1990 election. 
79 State Sector Act 1988, s 59( I). 
80 State Sector Act 1988, s 43. 
81 Scott, above, 78. See also the State Sector Act 1988, ss 36, 38. 
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The five year contract term was chosen to ensure that a chief executive worked 
across at least one election and, on a change of government, would work for the new 
government for a period before facing contract renewal or termination. This helps to 
reinforce the non-political professional and managerial culture of the public service. 
The criteria for contract renewal are primarily performance based. 82 The 
early 1990s tradition of re-appointing a chief executive for a further three years and 
then 'moving them on', appears to have been replaced by a more department-
specific approach in recent years. 83 The State Services Commissioner has a statutory 
obligation to regularly review the performance of each chief executive. 84 The views 
of the Minister are given significant weight, due to the importance of the chief 
executive and Minister retaining an effective working relationship. 85 Despite this, it 
is essentially the Commissioner, not the Minister, who determines whether the 
contract of a chief executive will be renewed, providing greater protection for 
political neutrality. 
B The Mixed Member Proportional Electoral System (MMP) 
The introduction of the Mixed Member Proportional electoral system (MMP) 
in 1996 has led to structural and practical changes in the public sector, introducing 
some political elements into previously apolitical roles. Minority and coalition 
governments have required public servants to deal with new issues, and have 
changed the way that some familiar institutions operate. MMP has also drawn new 
actors into executive government. 
82 Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP 
(3ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 81. 
83 Colin James The Tie that Binds: the Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives (Institute 
of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 48. 
84 State Sector Act 1988, s 43. 
85 The minister's lack of confidence in Christine Rankin was a key reason for the State Services 
Commissioner's decision not to reappoint Rankin as chief executive of the Department of Work and 
Income in 2001: Christine Kathryn Rankin v A-G in respect of the State Services Commissioner (2 
August 200 I, Employment Court Wellington, WRC 8/01, Goddard CJ.) 
25 
Each of these developments require public servants to look at new ways to 
maintain their political neutrality, as the risk that this will be compromised is 
increased with each extension of the public servant's role into the political sphere. 
I Minority governments 
By the end of the three-year term of the Labour-Progressive Coalition 
Government, seven of the first nine years under MMP will have been spent under 
minority governments. Working under a minority government can pose significant 
challenges for public servants as they navigate an environment of changing political 
alliances by the government. 
(a) Generating a parliamentary majority 
A government that does not have the authority of a majority must generate 
majority support in the House for legislation and government initiatives. Public 
servants can therefore face differing reporting and briefing requirements, and 
potentially varying accountabilities, with each new issue they work on.86 Labour 
signed a coalition agreement with the Progressive Coalition party in preparation for 
the 2002-2005 government term. In addition, however, Labour also signed 
agreements with the United Future party and the Green party. 87 Opening the 4]1h 
Parliament, the Honourable Helen Clark recognised these three agreements and then 
stated: 88 
My government also looks forward to co-operation with other parties on a case by 
case basis. 
86 Colin James Under New Sail: MMP and Public Servants (Institute of Policy Studies, VUW, 
Wellington, 1997) 7. 
87 Hon Helen Clark "Speech from the Throne" (Opening of the 4]1h Parliament, 27 August 2002). 
Available at <http://www. beehi ve.govt.n7J throne.cfm > (last accessed 3 September 2002). 
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The need for minority governments to generate a parliamentary majority for 
every Government Bill, including Supply Bills, also creates the risk that government 
may change hands part way through Parliament. 89 A change of government disrupts 
the work of public servants, who are likely to be required to advise upon and 
implement new policies. Public servants must also adjust to the working style of 
their new Minister, as they attempt to develop a positive working relationship with 
this new political master. 
(b) Select committees 
The proportional allocation of Members of Parliament to select committees 
poses a challenge to the public service when serving a minority govemment. 90 In 
1999-2002, for instance, the Labour-Alliance Government held a majority in only 
one of the thirteen subject select committees. 91 Select committees have had an 
increased level of contact with public servants, particularly chief executives, in 
recent years. The Cabinet Manual states: 92 
The primary responsibility of officials remains to their Minister when they provide 
information or advice to select committees . Officials are subject to ministerial 
direction in relation to answers to be given and information to be supplied to select 
committees. 
Despite this, the mere fact that a public servant appears to be defending a 
department that is the responsibility of a particular Minister can suggest political 
partiality to an uncritical viewer. This can occur even where the actual contribution 
by the public servant is strictly factual, and that servant has endeavoured not to be 
88 Hon Helen Clark "Speech from the Throne", above. 
89 James, above, 4. 
90 David McGee QC Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 1999 (Office of the Clerk, 
Wellington, 1999). Standing Order 197 states that the membership of select committees should as far 
as possible be proportional to party membership in the House. 
91 This was the Maori Affairs Select Committee. The thirteen subject select committees are listed in 
Standing Order 190. Parliament can set up additional select committees under Standing Order 186: 
Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 1999, above. 
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drawn into a political debate. If constitutionally inappropriate questioning by 
opposition MPs attempts to push officials beyond ministerial direction, "public 
servants will not be able to rely on a minority governing party ... to protect them."93 
Media coverage of select committee hearings then magnify any impact that this 
questioning may have upon public perceptions of political neutrality. 
This impact is likely to be further increased by the likelihood that subject 
select committees without a government majority will undertake inquiries into 
government activity, thus increasing this contact with public servants, in a drive to 
acquire political ' points' .94 
( c) Contact with non-government Members of Parliament 
One implication for public servants under a minority government (and 
potentially also under a coalition government) is an increased pressure from and 
contact with non-government MPs, as public servants are required to consult with 
other parties over government policies. 95 This consultation can potentially be 
extensive:96 
Public Servants must be ready to brief not only a coalition partner party or minister 
or MP but also any supporting party or MPs: in the 1999-2002 Parliament that 
included the Greens and New Zealand First and even, on free trade, the opposition 
parties. 
92 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001), para 5.69. 
93 Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP 
(3ed, Oxford University Press , Auckland , 1997) 14 . Consider, for instance, the aggressive 
questioning of the Te Puni Kokiri chief executive by the Maori Affairs Select Committee over the 
government's ' closing the gaps' programme in 200 I: Colin James Under New Sail: MMP and Public 
Servants (Institute of Policy Studies, VUW, Wellington, 1997) 31 . 
94 Colin James Under New Sail: MMP and Public Servants (Institute of Policy Studies, YUW, 
Wellington, 1997) 4. 
95 Palmer and Palmer, above, 14. 
96 Colin James The Tie that Binds: The Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 3. 
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This increased contact makes the provision of independent quality advice by 
public servants even more essential. This ensures that a relationship of trust is 
retained with the government without giving opposition MPs any opportunity to 
publicly criticise the service, which would potentially compromise future 
relationships. 97 As political jousting between parties becomes more commonplace, 
"public servants will need to be clear where the line lies between briefing and 
advising, which is their proper role, and political manoeuvring, which is the sphere 
of politicians and their political ad visors." 98 
2 Coalition governments 
Coalition governments can create challenges for public servants who must be 
aware of more than one political viewpoint as part of their obligations to 
government. This is a particular issue when public servants are accountable to 
Ministers from different parties. 
(a) Party differentiation 
One challenge for public servants serving a coalition government is the 
likelihood that coalition partners, who have different electoral objectives, will seek 
to differentiate themselves in voters' eyes. A public servant has obligations to both 
the government of the day and to their Minister, and can be placed in a difficult 
position when these obligations appear to come into conflict. The Minister's own 
obligations under collective ministerial responsibility ought to prevent this threat. 
There is, however, potential for Ministers in a coalition government to use the 'agree 
to disagree ' clause in the Cabinet Manual 2001. 99 Ministers may choose to do this to 
97 Palmer and Palmer, above, 15. 
98 Colin James Under New Sail: MMP and Public Servants (Institute of Policy Studies, VUW, 
Wellington, 1997) 7. 
99 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 200 I) para 3.23. The modification of collective 
responsibility to enable ministers to state publicly that they disagreed with a particular decision by 
Cabinet was included in the Cabinet Manual following its inclusion in the Labour-Alliance coalition 
agreement for 1999-2002 . This provision, including the ability to express alternative views in 
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ensure that voters identify differences between the political parties in government, 
even if the Minister must still follow Cabinet's ultimate decision. 100 
Even where the ' agree to disagree' clause is not used there can be significant 
strain in practice between an individual Minister and Cabinet, with a direct impact 
on public servants. 101 When the parties in government are seeking to differentiate 
themselves in voters' eyes, it is even more imperative that public servants do not 
compromise their neutrality by appearing to support one party position on an issue 
over the other party in government. 
(b) Short-term approach to policy making 
The need to negotiate with other parties can mean that policy decisions made 
by individual departments carry a great deal of political weight. Coalition 
governments are more likely to take a shorter-term, less strategic approach to policy 
making than single-party governments as they attempt to comply with their coalition 
agreements .102 This can be viewed as essential to ensure that coalitions remain in 
working order. In this way MMP has increased the uncertainty and complexity of 
policy making. 103 
A short-term approach can pose challenges for public servants who must 
implement such decisions and try to make them as effective as possible, while still 
acting consistently with the direction of their Responsible Minister. This can be 
difficult for public servants who were involved in offering policy advice to the 
Parliament, has been included in the coalition agreement between Labour and Progressive Coalition 
for the 2002-2005 term . 
IOO Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001), para 3.23 . 
IOI Paragraph 3.23 of the Cabinet Manual can only be used to identify different party positions. This 
clause cannot be used by individual Ministers to dissociate from Cabinet decisions : Cabinet Office 
Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001) para 3.24. 
102 Colin James Under New Sail: MMP and Public Servants (Institute of Policy Studies, VUW, 
Wellington, 1997) 7. 
103 State Sector Standards Board A Report to the Minister of State Services on: The Ethos of the State 
Sector (State Services Commission, Wellington, 200 I). Available on 
30 
Minister on an issue, particularly where the decision appears not to have taken into 
account concerns that they had raised. 
One practical implication of this, when applied to the formulation of 
legislation, can be seen in the negotiation between the Labour party and New 
Zealand First before Christmas 2001. In exchange for political support for 'urgency' 
for government business, Labour supported a piece of legislation sponsored by 
Winston Peters. This Bill, which gave police powers to curb alcohol consumption in 
public places, was not adequately prepared. Due to poor wording, the Bill as passed 
effectively banned all carrying of alcohol in public. 104 
( c) Politically appointed policy advisors 
The practice of Ministers (including the Prime Minister) appointing political 
policy advisors from outside the public service has increased over the past decade. 105 
There are normally one or more political appointees in ministerial offices. 106 
Appointees are 'political appointments', owing their allegiance primarily to the 
Minister, and providing 'contestable' sources of policy advice. Appointees are not 
bound by the convention of political neutrality, or by other rules governing the 
conduct of public servants. 107 These appointments are particularly likely under 
coalition governments: 10s 
[C]oalition governments [will probably] encourage these sorts of appointments as 
coalition partner parties, each with different electoral objectives, seek advice that is 
<http: //www.ssc.govt.nz/displav/ document.asp? avl o- I 2 I & Doc ID= I 4 70> (last accessed 20 
August 2002). 
104 Colin James The Tie that Binds: The Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 23. 
lOS Graham Scott Public Management in New Zealand: lessons and Challenges (Business 
Roundtable, Wellington, 200 I) 81. 
106 Interview with A, anonymous current Minister (the author, Wellington, I O September 2002). 
107 Colin James The Tie that Binds: The Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 60. 
IOS Colin James Under New Sail: MMP and Public Servants (Institute of Policy Studies, YUW, 
Wellington, 1997)7. 
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independent of their partners on portfolios held by their partner party or parties and 
seek independent assessment of initiatives and actions of those other ministers. 
The political appointment of policy advisors protects public perceptions of 
political neutrality in the public service to a certain extent. These appointments 
highlight the distinction between the role of public servants, as neutral policy 
ad visors, and the role of an appointee, as provider of politically partisan advice. 109 In 
this way, political appointees enable public servants to provide 'free and frank' 
balanced policy advice, without any pressure to tailor this advice to political 
demands. 110 
Political appointments will not necessarily always be in the best interests of 
public servants. There is a risk that a Minister will too readily accept appointee 
advice over that of the public service, potentially leading to poor policy decisions. In 
addition, if advice provided by an appointee is consistently different from that 
provided by the public service, and is consistently preferred by the Minister, a 
breakdown may occur in the relationship between the Minister and public servants. 
The Minister may feel that the public service is not sufficiently responsive to the 
Minister's needs when providing advice, or worse, that the service is operating to a 
different agenda. In such situations it could be difficult for public servants to 
continue to provide advice that is politically neutral. There may be a temptation to 
take a more party-political approach to make the advice more palatable for their 
Responsible Minister. 
( d) Conflict between loyalty to the Minister and to government 
Public servants "have a duty to the government as a whole - to the overall 
policy intentions of the government, to its cohesion, to co-ordination of policy and 
109 Graham Scott Public Management in New Zealand: Lessons and Challenges (Business 
Roundtable, Wellington, 200 I) 81. 
I IO Scott, above, 81. 
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administration and to the principles of good government." 111 The loyalty public 
servants owe to the government will normally fit comfortably with duties to a 
Responsible Minister. Even under a coalition government, the doctrine of collective 
ministerial responsibility should ensure that any differences of opinion are resolved 
at a high level, and that public servants are not required to attempt to balance both. 
Nevertheless, public servants may be challenged where there is a lack of a 
clear-cut overall policy direction by the government. This is likely to occur if the 
relationship between coalition partners is tense or uncertain. 112 Coalition partners 
will not always see eye to eye. In the words of the Prime Minister: "MMP is about 
majority building, not consensus." 113 
C An Increasingly Political Role for Public Servants? 
After the introduction of MMP in 1996 the requirement to provide 'free and 
frank advice' was removed from chief executives' performance agreements. 114 The 
basis for this removal was not clear. 115 The reference remains in other key 
documents that set out a chief executive's obligations. 116 Some commentators have 
suggested that public servants, particularly chief executives, should 'keep an eye on' 
the political environment as part of their advisory role: 117 
111 Colin James Under New Sail: MMP and Public Servants (Institute of Policy Studies, VUW, 
Wellington, 1997)61. 
112 James, above, 61. 
113 James, above, 73, quoting a speech by Labour leader Helen Clark to a National Housing 
Conference in Auckland on 23 Sept l 995. 
114 Graham Scott Public Management in New Zealand: lessons and Challenges (Business 
Roundtable, Wellington, 200 I) 80. 
115 Scott, above, 80. 
116 The obligation of chief executives to provide 'free and frank' advice is set out in: Cabinet Office 
Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 200 I), para 2.14 7; State Services Commission Responsibility and 
Accountability: Standards Expected of Public Service Chief Executives - Leiter to Chief Executives 
(Wellington , l 997) 2; and State Services Commission Public Service Code of Conduct 2001 
(Wellington, 2001) 10. 
117 Colin James Under New Sail: MMP and Public Servants (Institute of Policy Studies, VUW, 
Wellington, l 997) I 8. 
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[A] skilful chief executive, even while maintaining a strictly apolitical stance in the 
sense of neutrality among parties, keeps a weather eye on the politics and potential 
fallout of policy initiatives and programmes as an element in fully informing a 
Minister of all relevant factors. 
The line between political advice, and advice that merely takes into account 
the needs of the Minister, will not necessarily always be clear. In the view of a 
current Minister: 11 s 
It is political neutrality, but political neutrality does not mean having no sense of 
politics. You need it to make sure that policy advice is sufficiently comprehensive. 
You have got to have the political antennae; I call it "the front page of truth ." 
Public Servants must therefore balance their advice so that on the one hand 
they remain responsive to the Minister's needs, and on the other they do not appear 
to compromise their political neutrality. The Cabinet Manual attempts to describe 
the appropriate balance. It states that that when providing advice to their Minister: 119 
Officials must provide any factual or statistical material requested, but should not be 
required to offer comment or opinion on clearly political topics, such as policies 
mooted by other parties in Parliament. 
Public servants manage this balancing act on a regular basis. This balance can be 
delicate, however, and can be threatened by media attention. 
MMP has increased the potential for a more political role for public servants 
by increasing the political negotiations between parties. As a result of this: 120 
118 Interview with A, anonymous current Minister (the author, Wellington, I O September 2002). 
119 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001), para 2.148. 
120 Matthew Palmer The Relationship between Ministers and Public Servants: Forum Session /: 
Constitutional Overview (Paper presented to the New Zealand Centre for Public Law and the Institute 
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public servants can be more involved in political decision-making than they used to 
be because their skills and advice are likely relevant to the matters under 
negotiation. 
This was the case in the initial stages of the Labour-Alliance Government (1999-
2002), when public servants were required to be involved in negotiation with 
Alliance and other supporting parties to garner enough political support to make 
certain government policies viable. 121 A Minister who was involved in one such 
negotiation to generate support for a Bill, reflected: 122 
Our officials had to go and negotiate with the Greens over how much of the Bill 
they would accept. They had never had to do that before. They had in the past 
accepted something that had come down from one party saying, 'this is the way we 
are going'. Now all of a sudden to get the Bill though they had to be involved in it. 
For some of the officials that was really hard . 
The introduction of political appointees into ministerial offices has reduced 
the likelihood that public servants will be required to undertake this level of political 
negotiation. Despite this, the role of public servants remains more politically 
involved under MMP than historically. The possibility that a public servant will be 
required to brief a non-government MP on a Government Bill is one example of this. 
Other examples include the possibility that public servants will be required to report 
to ministers from different political parties, and the expectation by ministers that 
political considerations be included in policy advice. This political involvement 
increases the extent to which political parties, whether in government, support or 
opposition, will watch closely how public servants behave, in an attempt to identify 
any risk of party partiality. 
of Policy Studies forum, "The Relationship between Ministers and Public Servants", Wellington, 25 
October 200 I) 4. 
121 Interview with A, anonymous current Minister (the author, Wellington, 10 September 2002). 
122 Interview with A, anonymous current Minister (the author, Wellington, I O September 2002). 
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D Government Use of Public Servants in Public Presentations 
Ministers are increasingly requiring chief executives and senior officials to 
front news media interviews, bringing public servants increasingly into the public 
eye. A recent example of this was the use of officials in support of the government 
in the media briefing for ' Corngate ' (July 2002). 123 This support was solely in the 
provision of factual material to the Minister, for technical and administrative 
matters. Despite this, the fact that the officials participated in a public presentation 
by a Minister during an election campaign, has the potential to be misinterpreted by 
the public. Such assistance during a sensitive political period may have led some 
members of the public to believe that the officials present were supporting the 
political decisions made by the Labour party while in government. 
Although requests for public servant assistance in media presentations were 
initially only made for technical matters, these requests are increasingly occurring in 
relation to general policy issues, including adequacy of funding in areas such as 
health. 124 
E Public Criticism of the Public Service by Politicians 
There has been a recent increase in public criticism of public servants by 
Ministers, occasionally even by name. 125 This has serious implications for political 
neutrality .126 
123 Colin James "The Relationship between Mini sters and Chief Executives" (Speech to academics 
and members of the public service, Wellington , 6 August 2002). 
124 Colin James The Tie that Binds: The Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington , 2002) 24. 
125 Colin James The Tie that Binds: The Relationship behveen Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington , 2002) 27 . Consider for 
example Prime Minister Helen Clark's criticism of MFAT officials , reported in: Bruce Kohn 
"Rowling's Timor Policy" The Dominion Post 12 September 2002, Edition 2, 6 ; and Jonathan Milne 
"PM's 'shameful' words prompt trio to speak out" The Dominion Post 14 September 2002, Edition 2, 
2. 
126 Comment by participant under the Chatham House Rules at the series of forums on " The 
Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives", organised by the New Zealand Centre for 
Public Law and the Institute of Policy Studies (Wellington, October-November 200 I and April 2002.) 
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If there is public criticism, if there are public roles for public servants, if public 
servants are perceived to be gathering public power bases, that could be seen by 
ministers as threatening. The relationship might break down over time, the trust that 
is so important to the relationship might be mitigated and there might be a 
breakdown in loyalty on the part of the public service. 
Public criticism draws attention to public servants as distinct from their departments, 
and from government. This draws media attention to that department or official, in 
search of any hidden agenda. 
The greatest risk for neutrality posed by public criticism of officials is that 
those officials may start to answer back publicly. 127 As well as eroding trust between 
Ministers and officials, this would compromise public perception of political 
neutrality. 128 A public response by an official to criticism could be interpreted by the 
general public as an attack by that official on current government. 129 This could 
easily generate a perception that the public servant is politically partial, given that 
most challenges to government in the media are politically motivated attacks by 
political rivals. Public criticism has also been identified as a likely cause for the 
increased aggressiveness of media inquiry in the past few years. 130 
Comment quoted in: Colin James The Tie that Binds: The Relationship between Ministers and Chief 
Executives (Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 27. 
127 Matthew Palmer "Ministerial Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability: Conflict or 
Complement?" (Paper presented at the Institute for International Research conference on "Analysing 
and Understanding Crucial Developments in Public Law", Wellington, 4 April 200 l) 16. 
128 State Sector Standards Board A Report to the Minister of State Services on: The Ethos of the State 
Sector (State Services Commission, Wellington, 2001). Available on 
< http ://www.ssc.govt.112/d isp lay/ document.asp? avID= I 2 I &Doc ID= 14 70> (last accessed 20 
August 2002). 
129 Colin James The Tie that Binds: The Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 27. 
130 James, above, 40, 72. 
37 
F Official Information Act 1982 
The Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) has played a significant role in 
increasing the transparency of government processes. The Act specifically refers to 
the need to protect the convention of political neutrality when identifying possible 
reasons for withholding information. 131 Despite this, the Act still poses significant 
challenges to political neutrality. The OIA removed the veil of discretion that used to 
cover public service activities, exposing differences between the public service and 
Ministers. The Act increases public access to material about activities undertaken by 
the public service. There is now almost routine disclosure of the advice provided to 
Ministers by public servants, and the work undertaken by departments.132 This has 
generated public pressure to look ' behind ' the Minister to identify the specific steps 
that led to a particular outcome, particularly after major public events, such as the 
Cave Creek disaster. 133 As anonymity is eroded, absolute neutrality becomes even 
more essential to protect public confidence in the public service. 134 
G Breaches of the Convention 
1 Recent breaches of the convention 
Another challenge to the convention of political neutrality has been posed by 
public servants who ' walk the line' , sometimes breaching the convention publicly. 135 
131 Official Information Act 1982, s 9(2)(t)(iii) . Information can also be withheld to protect the 
convention of individual ministerial responsibility under section 9(2)(t)(ii) , and to protect the 
confidentiality of advice tendered by officials under section 9(2)(t)(iv) . 
132 James, above, 24. 
133 Juliet Philpott Public Servants and Public Accountability: the Convention of Anonymity (LLB 
(Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 200 I) 31. 
134 Names are not attached to most policy advice and advice is only released after the Responsible 
Minister has made their decision . Despite thi s, public access to policy advice increases public 
awareness of the significance of the role of officials . Increased public interest fuels media attention, 
which would draw attention to any political activity by public servants. 
135 Despite this , the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2002, which measures 
levels of corruption by officials and politicians, ranks New Zealand second equal out of over I 00 
countries. See : Michael Wintringham , State Services Commissioner (29 August 2002) Media 
Statement. Available on:<htt p: //ww w.ssc.go \t .nz/cl isp lay/docume nt.asp? av lD I l3& Doc1D ·?256> 
(last accessed 4 Sept 2002). 
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The most concerning breaches of the convention relate to the spate of leaks by lower 
level officials to opposition politicians and the media in 2001. 136 These leaks are 
sometimes attributed to public servants who are active in a political party, and who 
leak material when they feel that something is 'wrong' in the sense of offending that 
party's principles or policies: 137 
They almost see it as a right that, if the government is doing something they 
disagree with, they give the information to the party they are members of. That is 
something I wasn't aware of I O years ago. 
At a higher level, communication between the Serious Fraud Office director 
David Bradshaw and the government has been criticised by opposition leaders and 
the media as evidence of party partiality. 138 Bradshaw telephoned the Prime 
Minister's office and the head of the State Services Commission earlier this year to 
tell them of his inquiry into the 1996 donation to the National Party by Fay 
Richwhite. Although Bradshaw's disclosure was probably made in compliance with 
an obligation to disclose any delicate matters to the government, this has not stopped 
the media (and opposition politicians) from claiming evidence of political partiality. 
This incident highlights the tentative balance between a public servant' s 
loyalty to the government, and partiality as between political parties. It can be 
difficult for a senior public servant to decide what to do when there is widespread 
concern in a department that their chief executive is acting outside agreed values and 
136 Consider for instance leaks by a contractor within the Crown Company Monitoring Unit regarding 
the proposed 'Kiwibank' in 200 I: Colin James The Tie that Binds: The Relationship between 
Ministers and Chief Executives (Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, 
Wellington, 2002) 28, 31. 
137 Comment by participant under the Chatham House Rules at the series of forums on "The 
Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives", organised by the New Zealand Centre for 
Public Law and the Institute of Policy Studies (Wellington, October-November 200 I and April 2002.) 
Comment quoted in: James, above, 29. 
138 Colin Espiner "Politicians turn to public servant bashing in election year" The Press 20 May 2002, 
Edition 2, 9; Prosser, Richard "Donation to Labour needs checking" National Business Review 27 
May 2002 . 
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principles, thereby undermining the department's internal culture and external 
reputation. 139 
It is even less clear what the position is for government departments with 
independent responsibilities. Although independence by necessity implies an 
obligation to act impartially, the Code of Conduct does not govern departments such 
as the Reserve Bank. 140 The Governor of the Reserve Bank, Dr Don Brash, was 
severely criticised when he resigned from his position earlier this year then joined 
the National Party list within the month. His move led to public re-evaluation of his 
behaviour while in office. Statements made by Dr Brash at the Knowledge Wave 
Conference in 2001 re-emerged, with the media publicly questioning whether Brash 
in fact acted neutrally while Governor. 141 
Although independent government departments are outside the scope of this 
paper, most members of the public are not aware of the distinction between the 
Reserve Bank and other branches of the public service. As a result, any negative 
publicity arising from behaviour by employees of independent government 
departments is of concern to all public servants. 
2 Implications of a breach of the convention 
(a) Disciplinary implications 
Breaches of the convention of political neutrality can only be used to support 
disciplinary action to the extent that the convention is provided for in the Code of 
139 Graham Scott Public Management in New Zealand: Lessons and Challenges (Business Roundtable, Wellington, 200 I) 127. 
140 Only Departments listed in the First Schedule to the State Sector Act 1988 are governed by the Public Service Code of Conduct. 
141 Graeme Hunt "Frustration drives Brash to Politics" National Business Review Editorial Comment, 3 May 2002; New Zealand Press Association "Speak out then duck, Don" The Evening Post 3 August 200 I, Edition 3, 13. 
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Conduct. A breach of the convention can not itself give rise to disciplinary action. 142 
Realistically, however, the breadth of the references to the convention in the Code of 
Conduct make it unlikely that a public servant could significantly breach the 
convention without invoking disciplinary action. 
The standards set out in the Code of Conduct are implied into the terms and 
conditions of employment for every public servant. 143 Where a public servant 
undertakes an activity referred to in the Code that compromises, or appears to 
compromise their political neutrality, they can be subjected to disciplinary action for 
breach of contract. Given the broad application of the Code to all public servants this 
can appear rather harsh. A public servant in a role with no contact with the Minister, 
policy development or implementation is still limited in the extent to which they are 
able to exercise their right of free speech in the media on political issues. Yet their 
role may be secretarial or administrative, and their political activity unlikely to have 
any real impact on public perceptions of the convention of political neutrality. 
In fact the discretion available to employers in enforcing the Code militates 
against these concerns. This is reinforced by the Code, which states: 144 
Determining what is appropriate in any particular case will depend on the extent of 
the participation of the individual, the nature of the issue, and the position held by 
the individual in the Public Service. 
Departments will only take disciplinary action when activity by a public servant is 
not appropriate to the constraints of their position. This has the advantage of 
providing departments with significant flexibility when considering whether activity 
ought to give rise to disciplinary action in a particular situation. This does not 
encourage transparency, however, which can be a problem given the reliance by 
142 A public servant who breaches section 52 or section 53 of the Electoral Act 1993 would still be obliged to resign from their position, and could be fined under section 48 of that Act. 143 Interview with C, anonymous senior public servant (the author, Wellington, 4 September 2002). 144 State Services Commission Public Service Code a/Conduct 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 5. 
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public servants on the political activity of their peers when governing their own 
behaviour. 
(b) Constitutional implications 
Constitutional conventions evolve continually. Their practice and obligatory 
elements mean that the form (and sometimes even the existence) of the convention 
can be very transient. Unlike laws, conventions are not bound to a particular written 
form. In fact, although the expression of conventions in documents such as the 
Cabinet Manual can help shape a convention, the ambit and characteristics of the 
convention in practice can be rather different. 145 The repudiation of a convention can 
even generate doubt as to whether that practice ever existed as a convention. 146 This 
can occur even where the convention is described in the Cabinet Manual, as 
inclusion in this document does not of itself confer constitutional status. 
As a result, one of the risks when a public servant breaches the convention of 
political neutrality is that this political behaviour may become generally accepted 
practice, gradually reducing the ambit of the convention. If political neutrality in the 
New Zealand Public Service was undermined in this manner, the efficacy of 
government would also be reduced, as public servants become less willing to 
respond to the needs of their political masters. In the long term this convention 
would give way to the politicisation of the public service. 
145 Phillip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2001) 275. 
146 Joseph, above, 271 . 
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V THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL NEUTRALITY IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Evaluation of Political Neutrality in New Zealand 
The convention of political neutrality has two key purposes. The first is to 
ensure that individual ministerial responsibility remains an effective method of 
controlling the public service. The second is to preserve government, and public , 
confidence in the public service. 
Despite an initial lack of confidence in the public service by the incoming 
Labour-Alliance Government in 1999, early in that government term the confidence 
was restored and the public service developed a good relationship with 
government. 147 The current Labour-Progressive Government expressed no concerns 
about the public service when commencing their term of government. These 
examples suggest that current and incoming governments still retain sufficient 
confidence in the public service to maintain the efficacy of individual ministerial 
responsibility . 
Despite a willingness to question the neutrality of individual public servants, 
the media has not questioned the neutrality of the public service as a whole. Perhaps 
as a result of this, there does not appear to be any public doubt that the New Zealand 
Public Service is politically neutral. 
Viewed in light of these dual purposes, then, political neutrality continues to 
operate effectively in New Zealand. There is no guarantee, however, that this will 
remain the case. The developments set out in Part IV impose a cumulative effect 
upon the operation of the convention. Although examples of public servants 
' walking the line ' are currently still limited, the public attention generated by these 
examples increase the likelihood that the convention will be undermined. If 
147 Colin James The Tie that Binds: The Relationship behveen Ministers and Chief Executives 
(Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 61 . 
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disciplinary action is not seen to result from these incidents, other public servants 
may also undertake this level of political activity. Despite this, privacy and political 
concerns are likely to prevent the State Services Commission and individual 
departments from publicising any disciplinary action that arises from political 
behaviour. 148 Other steps are necessary, then, to further clarify for public servants 
what behaviour falls within the convention, and what is prohibited. 
MMP has led to an infiltration by politics into the everyday functions of 
public servants. The introduction of political appointees into ministerial offices to 
undertake negotiation between government and supporting parties, represents a 
positive step in protecting the public service from too much political interaction. 
Despite this, the political involvement of the public service has increased. Even 
operating under the dual political mastery of Ministers from different coalition 
parties can challenge the neutrality of public servants, who must not appear to favour 
one Minister over the other. 
Each of these developments increases the likelihood that public servants will 
be perceived to be acting partially towards one of the political parties. Ongoing party 
negotiation and interaction under minority or coalition government generates a level 
of political tension and media attention that prior to MMP would have arisen only 
around an election. Under MMP, public servants must display exemplary behaviour 
throughout the duration of the government term. 
Other developments that have impacted upon public servants over the past 
few decades include an increased overall transparency of government processes, due 
to the Official Information Act 1983, and the marketing of information gathered 
under this Act to the wider public by the media. Combined with the increase in 
criticism by politicians, and the use of the media as a publicity tool by high profile 
148 Interview with C, anonymous senior public servant (the author, Wellington, 4 September 2002). 
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public servants, 149 these developments have transformed the public service into an 
object of interest and entertainment for the public. This has created a situation in 
which the media will now jump upon, and manipulate, any behaviour by public 
servants that has a political element. 
This is particularly concerning given the apparent reduction in commitment 
to political neutrality within the public service. The mobility of the New Zealand 
work force has increased staff turnover, weakening the extent to which political 
neutrality can be effectively protected through internal self-monitoring and peer-
guidance.150 In addition, commitment to political neutrality has been weakened by a 
societal reluctance to constrain personal behaviour to comply with professional 
obligations. 151 . Public servants are unlikely to monitor their own behaviour 
appropriately, unless the importance of complying with political neutrality and the 
other conventions governing the public service are emphasised sufficiently in their 
training. 
The increased media willingness to identify political partiality in the Public 
Service also means that traditional protection of neutrality by requiring public 
servants to take leave for candidacy, is no longer sufficient. The ability of public 
servants to make partisan political statements during a campaign, and then return to 
the public service unchallenged if not appointed, is no longer appropriate in this new 
media-focussed political environment. 152 
149 This remains rare, but when the media has been used in this way this has had a significant impact 
upon public awareness of the public service. Consider the attention generated by Christine Rankin, 
who, while chief executive of the Department of Work and Income, encouraged media publicity prior 
to her Employment Court action against the State Services Commissioner. Other example is the 
publicity sought by Celia Lashie, Nelson Special Education Service Manager, to draw attention to 
youth offending: Juliet Philpott Public Servants and Public Accountability: the Convention of 
Anonymity (LLB (Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 200 I) 25. 
ISO State Sector Standards Board A Report to the Minister of State Services on: The Ethos of the State 
Sector (State Services Commission, Wellington, 2001) . Available on <http ://www.ssc.govt.nz 
/display/document.asp?Navl[)~ I I l&Docf D= I 4 70> (last accessed 20 August 2002). 
151 State Sector Standards Board A Report to the Minister of State Services on: The Ethos of the State 
Sector, above. 
152 It is possible for a department to take disciplinary action against a public servant who returns to 
the public service after an unsuccessful candidacy that was damaging to the department. A public 
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Political neutrality remains central to the public service, but the extent to 
which this will continue to be the case is reliant on increased protection of the 
convention by ongoing reinforcement of these values, and strict regulation of 
behaviour in certain situations. This paper suggests that traditional methods of 
protecting the convention through the Electoral Act 1993, the Public Service Code 
of Conduct and the Cabinet Manual are no longer sufficient. Although these 
methods provide a good basis for the protection of the convention, in order to 
survive recent challenges, additional layers of protection are necessary. 
B Recommendations for Effective Protection of Political Neutrality 
This section sets out recommendations for the more effective protection of 
the political neutrality of the New Zealand Public Service. These suggestions draw 
upon some of the ways in which other countries protect political neutrality, and upon 
views of current members of the New Zealand Public Service and government. 
1 Mandatory resignation before candidacy for election 
(a) Overseas practice 
In Australia and in Canada, public servants must resign from their position 
before being nominated as a candidate for election. 153 Each country also provides 
measures to mitigate the harshness of this requirement. Canadian public servants 
may apply to the Public Service Commission of Canada for leave without pay to 
stand as a candidate. 154 In contrast, in Australia, if a candidate only takes leave from 
servant on leave is still bound by the terms and conditions of their contract. (Interview with B, 
anonymous senior public servant (the author, Wellington, 17 September 2002). 
153 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Australian Constitution) s 44. 
154 Canadian Public Service Employment Act 1985, s 33(3). 
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the public service, their election is void. 155 Instead, the Australian Public Service Act 
1999 provides for a right of re-appointment to the public service if a public servant 
fails to be elected. 156 
Although the Australian approach of requiring resignation initially appears 
harsh, public servants have a right to return to their position if unsuccessful. 157 This 
right is limited only by the requirement that the public servant's resignation to 
contest the election took effect within 6 months before the closing date for 
nominations, and that the candidacy was unsuccessful. 158 Public Servants are entitled 
to be re-employed on the same basis, with the same or similar duties and at the same 
classification as they had before resigning. 159 This approach protects the 
constitutional principle that a public servant is politically neutral, by making clear 
that if a public servant wishes to be political they must resign from their position. 
Despite this, this approach does not protect the public service if the candidate makes 
damaging statements about the government while campaigning, then rejoins the 
public service. 
A more practical method of protecting political neutrality has been adopted 
in Canada. The discretionary candidacy leave available in Canada enables a 
department to determine whether an unsuccessful political campaign would threaten 
political neutrality, by assessing the contact that that official has with Ministers and 
the public in their role. The Public Service Commission of Canada will only grant 
candidacy leave: 160 
155 Australian Constitution, Section 44(iv) . See also Sykes v Cleary ( 1992) 176 CLR 177 (HCA), 
where the election of a teacher with the Victorian Department of Education was found to be void as 
he had not resigned from his position before nominating as a candidate. 
156 Australian Public Service Act 1999 (No. 147, 1999) s 32 . 
157 Australian Public Service Act 1999 (No. 147, 1999) s 32. 
158 Australian Public Service Act 1999 (No. 147, 1999) s 32 ( l ). The election must also be listed in 
paragraph 3.13 of the Public Service Regulations 1999, No. 300. 
159 Australian Public Service Regulations 1999 (No. 300, Division 3.2) para 3.15 . 
16° Canadian Public Service Employment Act 1985, s 33(3). 
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if it is of the opinion that the usefulness to the Public Service of the employee in the 
position the employee then occupies would not be impaired by reason of that 
employee having been a candidate. 
Even discretionary candidacy leave has been criticised by the Canadian 
courts as posing risks for political neutrality: 161 
the ordinary incidents of a campaign for nomination and election to Parliament or a 
legislature include at least a real potential for public disagreement with major 
subsisting federal government policy. A credible campaign may demand it; the 
enthusiasm of a campaign may invite it, perhaps irresistibly. A public servant 
entering into a nomination or election campaign as a candidate must be taken to 
realize that he may, more likely unintentionally than not, call into legitimate 
question at least his apparent ability to function thereafter impartially. He should not 
expect to be paid while running nor to return unchallenged to his position if the race 
is lost. 
Discretionary candidacy leave is only appropriate, therefore, when a return to the 
public service by that public servant is highly unlikely to compromise the political 
neutrality of the public service. 
(b) Implementation in New Zealand 
This paper recommends that a three-tier system be put in place in New 
Zealand for public servants who wish to stand for Parliament. All public servants 
would be governed by the principle that public servants must resign before standing 
for Parliament. The only exception to this principle would be for low-level public 
servants, who may apply for discretionary candidacy leave from the State Services 
Commission. Public servants would only be eligible for candidacy leave if a 
campaign critical of government would be unlikely to compromise their role or the 
public service. By making leave discretionary, rather than New Zealand's current 
l6l Osborne v Canada (Treasury Board) [ 1988] 3 F.C. 219 (Federal Court of Appeals) para 20. 
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system, the State Services Commission could consider the demands of the individual 
public servant's role when allocating leave. In particular, the Commission could take 
into account any professional contact with Ministers, other politicians, and the 
public. 
For higher-level public servants, resignation before candidacy would better 
protect political neutrality than providing candidacy leave. Resignation would enable 
the Commission to decide after a campaign whether neutrality would be threatened 
by the return of that public servant to their position. This means that the Commission 
could take into account all statements made by the applicant during their election 
campaign when deciding whether to reappointment them. This also has the 
advantage of providing an incentive to Public Servants who are not confident about 
their chances of election, to 'tone down' their election campaign, to ensure that their 
reappointment prospects are not compromised. 
In addition to mandatory resignation before candidacy, a more formal 
requirement should be put into place for department chief executives. This is 
necessary following the aftermath of Don Brash's resignation as Governor of the 
Reserve Bank, then announcement of his candidacy for National only weeks later. 
Brash's resignation and announcement were, strictly speaking, consistent with the 
current requirements for chief executives. Despite this, the significant media 
attention that was devoted to this move, and the questions that were raised about 
Brash' s neutrality while in office, suggest that this is an issue that requires tighter 
regulation. It is the author's understanding that the State Services Commissioner 
considered introducing into the employment contract for the new Reserve Bank 
Governor, a minimum period after resignation from public office before they may 
stand for Parliament. This is an important move given the potentially significant 
impact another chief executive resignation and swift move to politics could have 
upon public confidence in the public service. This paper recommends that a 
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minimum period between resignation from public office and standing for Parliament 
be introduced into the employment contract for all chief executives.
162 
2 Category-based clarification of behaviour expected of public servants 
Effective political neutrality is reliant upon the exercise of good judgement 
by public servants when regulating their own conduct. Greater clarification of 
government expectations of public servants increases the likelihood that public 
servants will make the right decision. One way to clarify expectations of public 
servants is by introducing categories into the public service. This enables the 
tailoring of rules and guidance to the demands of a public servant's individual 
position. 
(a) Overseas practice 
In the United Kingdom, the civil service is specifically divided into three 
categories for this purpose. These categories are set out in the United Kingdom Civil 
Service Management Code. 163 They consist of the politically free category 
(industrial and non-office grades), the politically restricted category (Executive 
Officer level and higher), and an intermediate category (all other staff, mainly 
clerical and typing grades.) The Management Code sets out specific rules for the 
political activity of public servants within each category. Off-duty political activity, 
including campaigning for election, is permissible for the politically free category, 
while the politically restricted category is prohibited from taking part in any national 
political activities. 164 Some flexibility is retained through the discretion available to 
departments regarding employee involvement in some political activities.
165 
162 This period could be for one year, and be similar in application to the ' restraint of trade' 
provisions that are commonly included in employment contracts. 
163 United Kingdom Civil Service Management Code, Rule 4.4.1. Available on: <http://www. 
cabinet-office.gov.uk/ civilservice/managementcode> (last accessed 15 September 2002). This Code 
is issued under the authority of the United Kingdom Civil Service Order in Council 1995 (IO)(b). 
164 United Kingdom Civil Service Management Code, Rule 4.4.6, 4.4.1 b. 
165 United Kingdom Civil Service Management Code, Rule 4.4.3. 
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(b) Implementation in New Zealand 
The civil service in the United Kingdom is designed with a clearly defined 
structure and hierarchy. 166 The role of each political servant, and their contact with 
the Minister, is closely related to this structure. In contrast, the New Zealand Public 
Service is more fluid in its allocation of grades and responsibilities, 167 although this 
may be changing. 168 In addition, when compared to the United Kingdom civil 
service, the New Zealand Public Service is small and fragmented. 
These factors limit the extent to which categorisation would be effective as a 
means of imposing strict rules upon the conduct of New Zealand public servants. 
Despite this, some categorisation of the service would be beneficial. This paper 
recommends that a limited category structure be introduced into the New Zealand 
Public Service to enable greater clarification of the behaviour expected from public 
servants. Provided that this structure remains at guidance-level, the fluidity of public 
servant roles and responsibilities will not render categorisation ineffective. 
The development of a category structure would permit the State Services 
Commissioner to provide more specific guidance to public servants, whatever their 
level. Categorisation would enable the State Services Commissioner and government 
departments to take into account divisions in policy-advisory, policy-
implementation, and policy-free roles when describing permissible political activity. 
166 The Management Code, for instance, refers to industrial and non-office grades, Executive Officers 
and related grades such as Information Officers, clerical and typing grades. See: United Kingdom 
Civil Service Management Code, above, paras 4.4.2, 4.4.9. 
167 Levels of public servant are not standardised across departments, as each department has its own 
structure and pay scales. A role in one department will not necessarily equate with one in a similar 
department. Alternatively the role may not involve the same level of policy content or public contact. 
168 The State Services Commissioner has undertaken to bring forward proposals to develop a senior 
management development regime for the Public Service by the end of September 2002. This regime 
would replace the ineffective Senior Executive Service that was established under the State Sector 
Act 1988. If this move is implemented, this regime could be used as a structural guide for the more 
detailed provision of behavioural expectations to senior management employees. This would assist in 
getting around the current lack of clear roles across the government departments currently. See: State 
Services Commission Briefing/or the Minister of State Services (Wellington, 2002) 13. 
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Categorisation would also enable the needs of particular departments to be taken into 
account, particularly those with significant security demands. Currently, this level of 
specificity is available only for chief executives. 169 
The Public Service Code of Conduct applies to all government department 
employees. 170 Some of these public servants, such as administrative staff, could 
comfortably undertake even high-level political activity without harming the 
political neutrality of the public service as a whole. The potential harshness of this is 
mitigated by the fact that departments are unlikely to take disciplinary action against 
breaches of the Code by these lower level public servants, given that they pose no 
threat to political neutrality. Although this approach promotes flexibility, this is 
achieved at a significant cost to clarity and transparency. This is a problem given the 
importance of public perceptions of neutrality. 
This paper recommends that lower-level public servants be specifically 
identified in the Code as being permitted to undertake limited political activity. This 
identification can be descriptive, by reference to extent of contact with policy, and 
level of professional contact with politicians and the public. Public servants who are 
involved in work with a policy content would make up a second category. A third 
category would comprise of chief executives, whose role demands exemplary, 
politically neutral behaviour. 171 Inclusion of chief executives in this structure 
facilitates internal monitoring of chief executive behaviour, as well as providing 
public servants with an incentive to strive for this level of neutrality. 
169 Consider the range of guidance material published by the State Services Commissioner for chief 
executives. This range includes: Standards Expected of Chief Executives - Standards Letter and Key 
Documents (Wellington 1997), and from the Guidance Series: The Senior Public Servant (Wellington 
1995). 
I70 The Public Service Code of Conduct applies to all public servants, as defined by the State Sector 
Act 1988, s 27. This definition inc ludes almost all government departments. 
171 Top-tier senior public servants could also be included in this category. 
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3 Reinforcement of a public service culture 
(a) The need for reinforcement 
The regulation of the New Zealand Public Service is very reliant on the 
ability of public servants to manage their own behaviour according to the constraints 
of their position. Even with detailed guidance, a public servant is likely to find 
themselves in more than one situation in their career in which they do not know how 
they ought to behave. This is where the culture and values of the public service are 
essential: 172 
In theory, public servants are only promoted to a senior level if there is confidence 
that the public servant's judgement is good. This is what makes the culture of the 
public service so important. Fundamentally, this is about judgement more than it is 
about rules, as the rules can never be sophisticated or detailed enough. 
A new employee in the public service is only likely to pay close attention to 
principles that are supported by their colleagues, as they learn the requirements of 
their new position. The public service culture must, therefore, include recognition of 
the importance of political neutrality for this convention to be effective. 
The State Sector Standards Board ' s Report on the Ethos of the State Sector 
noted several trends that are detrimentally affecting the public service culture. 173 
One such trend is the increased mobility of the New Zealand work force, which has 
eroded state sector career patterns. As well as compromising the ' public service' 
ethos among staff, this has led to a loss of institutional knowledge due to frequent 
staff turnover. Another trend compromising the public service ethos relates to 
172 Interview with Patricia Sarr, senior public servant, Ministry of Justice (the author, Wellington, 4 
September 2002). 
173 State Sector Standards Board A Report to the Minister of State Services on: The Ethos of the State 
Sector (State Services Commission , Wellington , 2001) . Available on 
< http ://ww w.ssc.govt. nz/d isp lav/ cloc um ent.as p?NavlD= 12 1 & Doc! D= 14 70> (last accessed 20 
August 2002). The Board defined ' ethos ' as the "values and culture demonstrated by organisations 
and individuals in the state sector." 
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changing behavioural norms in society. These have led to "an increasing reluctance 
of staff to constrain behaviour away from work to the standards required in 
employment." 174 As a result of these trends: 175 
[M]any public servants do not understand the basic rule of ministerial responsibility 
and the corollaries of loyalty, party-political neutrality and anonymity. 
The lack of a public service culture means that departments are inclined to 
become insular, and less likely to consider the impact of their actions on the public 
service as a whole. This can be significant when these implications have long-term 
constitutional significance rather than immediate consequences. For instance, a 
public servant' s political involvement may not immediately threaten their Minister's 
confidence in their work, but can still foster a belief within their department that 
such involvement is of no consequence. This would be likely to lead to an increase 
in the level of political activity in that department, with a corresponding impact upon 
perceptions of political neutrality in the wider public service. 
(b) Options for reinforcement 
The State Services Commissioner is already attempting to mcrease 
awareness of the importance of values such as political neutrality within the public 
service, following the State Services Board's report. 176 Although steps are being 
taken to reinforce values such as political neutrality: 177 
174 State Sector Standards Board A Report to the Minister of State Services on: The Ethos of the State 
Sector, above. 
175 Comment by participant under the Chatham House Rules at the series of forums on "The 
Relationship between Ministers and Chief Executives", organised by the New Zealand Centre for 
Public Law and the Institute of Policy Studies (Wellington, October-November 2001 and April 2002.) 
Comment quoted in: Colin James The Tie that Binds: The Relationship between Ministers and Chief 
Executives (Institute of Policy Studies/New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Wellington, 2002) 37-8. 
176 Michael Wintringham, State Services Commissioner (16 August 200 I) Media Statement. 
Available on: <http: //www .ssc.govt. nz /disp lav/doc ument. as p?NavlD= l 13& Doc l0=?256> (last 
accessed 4 Sept 2002). 
177 State Services Commission State Services Commissioner 's Annual Report on the State Services 
(2 001) from the Annual Report of the State Services Commission for the year ending 30 June 2001 
(Wellington, 200 I) 23 
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These efforts need to be systematic, and more visibly led from the top, rather than 
resting with individual managers. 
Political neutrality can be reinforced in the culture of government 
departments through increased facilitation of discussion about this issue. Seminars 
and workshops are needed for public servants across the public service to discuss the 
issues facing them. Environments such as these generate discussion by public 
servants about the underlying reasons for neutrality, and encourage public servants 
to take personal responsibility for their behaviour. Focussing on neutrality in 
ongoing public service training "says that this is a live issue and one which is really 
important." 178 
Promoting these values through facilitation of discussion is particularly 
important for experienced public servants. These public servants may well become 
complacent about the constraints of political neutrality unless there is mature and 
regular discussion of these constraints: 179 
In the Knowledge working-end of the Public Service, discipline is very hard to 
impose. People are clever, and they know they are clever and they think they know 
what is right, and mostly they do. They learn lessons by absorbing it themselves in 
their own way and at their own pace and then they come up with an answer. 
These public servants are also the least likely to respond to further guidance 
material from the State Services Commission, as this material is unlikely to be 
targeted at their level or easily seen as relevant to their particular situations. These 
are people whose neutrality dilemmas are also likely to be complex beyond the 
range of the State Services Commissioner's guidelines. 18° For these public servants, 
178 Interview with Patricia Sarr, senior public servant, Ministry of Justice (the author, Wellington, 4 
September 2002). 
179 Interview with 8, anonymous senior public servant (the author, Wellington, 17 September 2002). 
180 Interview with Patricia Sarr, senior public servant, Ministry of Justice (the author, Wellington, 4 
September 2002). 
then, simply promoting the Code without an opportunity for discussion would be 
ineffective. 
Another possible way to strengthen the public service culture, and political 
neutrality within this culture, is through the Partnership for Quality between the 
State Services Commission and the Public Service Association. The Partnership was 
an early initiative of the Labour-Alliance Government, "designed to more strongly 
integrate the perspectives of staff in the operation of the state sector." 181 This 
integration potentially provides an opportunity for a comprehensive approach to the 
promotion of values in the public service. The increased involvement of public 
servants in the management of the service through the Public Service Association 
should also increase the sense of ownership by public servants over this process. 
Hopefully this will foster constitutional and management level discussion within the 
public service, increasing perception of the public service as a unifying body with a 
certain culture. 
VII CONCLUSION 
I am firmly in the camp of those who conclude ... that the public management 
system, especially that part designed to preserve the political neutrality of the Public 
Service , is fundamentally sound . That was my view when I was appointed 
Commissioner. It remains my view today. Calls for radical change are misplaced. 
However, that does not excuse us from providing better value to the citizens of New 
Zealand by improving our performance. 182 
This paper supports the view of the State Services Commissioner that 
political neutrality remains a core feature of the New Zealand Public Service, but 
that this is no reason for complacence. Maintaining public perception of political 
181 State Services Commission Report of the Advisory Group on the Review of the Centre 
(Wellington, 2002) Appendix 8, 65. 
182 State Services Commission State Services Commissioner 's Annual Report on the State Services 
(200 I) from the Annual Report of the State Services Commission for the year ending 30 June 2001 
(Wellington, 2001) 1. 
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neutrality is an ongoing concern, particularly given the increased media focus and 
other developments that have challenged public servants in recent years. The public 
service will need to pay particular attention to the demands of political neutrality as 
they adjust to minority and coalition governments under MMP. Increased contact 
with ( and even briefing of) non-government politicians, and facing select 
committees without a government majority are only two of the developments that 
could threaten political neutrality if public servants do not continue to guard against 
this. 
Political neutrality is not merely important to the constitutional legitimacy of 
the public service. This convention is central to the retention of a relationship of 
absolute trust and confidence between Ministers and their departments. Without this 
relationship, a breakdown in communication would render ministerial responsibility 
ineffective as a method of control over the public power exercised by the 
bureaucracy. 
The appearance of political neutrality of the public service is essential to 
ensure public confidence in government. If there is a public perception that 
departments are operating independently of their political masters, the legitimacy of 
the New Zealand government, based as it is on democratic validity, will be 
compromised. 
This paper sets out some of the ways in which political neutrality could be 
better protected in the New Zealand Public Service. Some of these suggestions, such 
as the introduction of mandatory resignation before public servants stand for 
Parliament, involve some statutory amendment. Despite this, the paper does not 
suggest that the overall management of the public service be revamped. Instead, 
protection of this convention will best be achieved through its promotion within the 
values of public service culture, and facilitation of discussion about what political 
neutrality means in the New Zealand political climate. A convention is only as 
strong as the commitment of its actors. In the case of the New Zealand Public 
Service, it will be the extent to which individual public servants manage the 
balancing act inherent in their role, that will determine whether, or in which form, 
the convention of political neutrality will survive the challenges of the next ninety 
years. 
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